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This paper considers whether local bank participation exerts an impact on the spreads for syndicated 
loans in Russia. Following Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001), we test whether local banks possess a 
superior ability to deal with information asymmetries. Using a sample of 528 syndicated loans to 
Russian borrowers, we perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including information 
on local bank participation and the characteristics of loans and borrowers. Unlike earlier studies, we 
distinguish foreign banks with a local presence from those without such presence. The intuition here 
is that a local presence may influence a foreign bank’s monitoring ability and access to information 
about borrowers. We observe no significant impact on the spread when there is local bank participa-
tion in a syndicated loan, nor do we find any significant influence of the presence of domestic-
owned banks or foreign-owned banks on the spread. Additional estimations considering subsamples 
with exacerbated information asymmetries provide similar results. Therefore our conclusion is that 
local banks do not benefit from an advantage in monitoring ability and in information in Russia. 
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Asymmetric information and loan spreads in Russia: 





Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan, onko paikallisen pankin osallistumisella vaikutusta syndikaattilai-
nojen korkoeroihin Venäjällä. Bergerin, Klapperin ja Udellin (2001) tapaan testaamme tässä tutki-
muksessa, onko paikallisilla pankeilla parempi kyky käsitellä epäsymmetrisen informaation ongel-
maa. Aineisto sisältää 528 syndikaattilainaa venäläisille yrityksille. Korkoeroa selitetään työssä laa-
jalla joukolla lainoihin ja lainanottajiin liittyviä ominaisuuksia, mutta tärkein muuttuja on kotimais-
ten pankkien osallistuminen syndikaattiin. Aikaisemmista tutkimuksista poiketen ulkomaiset pankit 
jaetaan tässä työssä niihin, joilla on toimintaa Venäjällä, ja niihin, joilla ei ole. Jaottelun taustalla on 
ajatus, että paikallinen läsnäolo voi vahvistaa pankin kykyä valvoa ja saada tietoa lainanottajista. Tu-
lokset eivät kuitenkaan tue tätä näkemystä, vaan paikallisen pankin osallistuminen ei vaikuta kor-
koeroon. Sen lisäksi tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että kotimaisten ja ulkomaisten pank-
kien osallistumisella ei näytä olevan tilastollisesti merkitsevää vaikutusta korkoeroon. Estimoinnit 
toistetaan myös osa-aineistoissa, joissa epäsymmetrisen informaation merkitys korostuu, mutta tu-
lokset eivät muutu. Tutkimuksen johtopäätös on, että paikallisilla pankeilla ei ole lisäetua valvon-
nassa tai tiedonsaannissa Venäjällä. 
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1  Introduction  
 
Russia presents a fascinating laboratory for the study of emerging market growth. While the world 
average for the banking sector’s ratio of domestic credit to GDP was 55.8% in 2005, despite im-
pressive banking sector expansion, Russia’s was just 25.7% that year (EBRD,2006).
1 Moreover, the 
level of bank lending in Russia remains stunningly low.
2 Given the well-established positive rela-
tionship between bank lending and growth (Levine, 2005), Russia’s shortcomings in terms of bank 
lending could be seen as an impediment to economic development. 
Examining Russian borrowing more closely, we find a significant rise in syndicated loans, 
that is, loans where two or more banks jointly grant funds to a borrower. The volume of syndicated 
loans in Russia increased from just under $11 billion in 1997 to $117 billion in 2006.
3 These figures 
are significant also in comparison to the amounts of credit to non-financial private sector in the 
same period, which BIS puts at about $42 billion in 1997 and $313 billion in 2006. The expansion 
of syndicated lending has largely involved non-Russian banks, with Russian banks providing a 
mere 2.22% of funding for syndicated loans to Russian borrowers.
4 
Has the low participation of Russian banks in syndicated loans, in fact, constrained Rus-
sia’s financial development? Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) argue that local banks enjoy a dual 
advantage of monitoring ability and information about borrowers over non-local banks. They claim 
the lower spread for local banks in a sample of Argentinean loans evidences the existence of an in-
formational advantage. Nini (2004) investigates whether the participation of local banks in a syndi-
cate influences the loan spread using a sample of syndicated loans from 13 emerging countries in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. He concludes spreads are generally lower for syndicated loans 
where local banks participate. Again, this conclusion supports the view that local banks in emerging 
countries are well positioned to alleviate information asymmetries. 
Drawing from Nini (2004), we consider whether the participation of local banks has a 
similar impact on syndicated loan spreads in Russia. Our goal is to uncover whether local Russian 
banks take advantage of monitoring opportunities and access to information. This, in turn, helps an-
swer the larger question of whether the low participation of local banks in syndicated loans contrib-
utes to hampering Russia’s financial development by keeping loan spreads wide. 
 
1 The banking sector’s ratio of domestic credit to GDP was 13.3% in 2000. 
2 Rosstat figures show that only 6.5% of investment was financed by bank loans in 2005. The corresponding figure for 
2007 was 9.4%. 
3 Authors’ computations from Dealscan database. Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski and  
Laurent Weill 
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While Nini’s (2004) multi-country analysis includes a sample of 143 loans to Russian bor-
rowers, we consider a larger sample of 528 loans. We also distinguish between foreign banks with a 
local presence and those without. Nini (2004) defines a local bank simply as a domestic-owned 
bank and lumps foreign-owned banks and banks operating abroad as a single group. Yet, critical 
differences may exist in information and monitoring within these categories of banks. Foreign-
owned banks can exploit information on borrowers and the legal system through a local presence 
and in-country staff. 
This issue carries large implications for foreign banks contemplating the establishment of a 
subsidiary in Russia. A finding that foreign-owned banks with a local presence can offer smaller 
spreads in syndicated loan suggests a potential competitive edge over non-local banks in the market 
for syndicated loans. 
The impact of the participation of domestic-owned banks on syndicated loans also has 
normative implications for Russia. Unlike in most transition countries, Russia’s banking industry 
remains largely owned by domestic investors – most notably the state. Therefore, a finding of lower 
spreads for syndicated loans with domestic-owned bank participation supports preserving the pres-
ence of domestic-owned banks in the Russian banking industry, and, as a corollary, enhancing their 
participation in syndicated loans. 
Despite the boom in syndicated loans in Russia, this paper, to our best knowledge, is the 
first that specifically investigates the subject. Related studies either deal generally with the topic of 
syndicated loans in emerging markets or the determinants of spreads of syndicated loans.
5 Altunbas 
and Gadanecz (2004), for example, study the determinants of the spread for a sample of loans from 
emerging markets that includes Russia. They focus on the potential impact of macroeconomic fac-
tors and loan characteristics, and identify macro- (e.g. GDP growth) and micro- (e.g. loan maturity) 
determinants of the spread. Godlewski and Weill (2008) investigate the determinants of the decision 
to syndicate a loan using a sample of loans from emerging countries that includes Russia. They ob-
serve the impact of loan characteristics (e.g. loan size, maturity, presence of covenants) and institu-
tional factors (e.g. legal environment) on the decision to syndicate a loan, and suggest that cross-
country differences in the expansion of syndicated loans may be explained by cross-country institu-
tional differences. 
 
4 We estimate Russian banks provided $5.5 billion in funding for syndicated loans in 2006. 
5 Nini (2004) straddles both strands of the literature.  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition  BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/ 2009 




                                                
Three recent papers deal specifically with spreads of syndicated loans. Carey and Nini 
(2007) provide evidence that loan spreads are smaller for corporate borrowers in Europe than in the 
US. They show that this difference is not linked to borrower, loan or lender characteristics, and of-
fer “home bias” as a possible explanation. Foccarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008) and Ivashina 
(2009) investigate a possible role of the share of the lead bank in the loan on the spread from differ-
ent perspectives. Indeed, this share can mitigate information asymmetries between the banks par-
ticipating in a lending syndicate. The studies find evidence of a negative impact on a sample of 
loans (one from the world, the other from the US) that suggests that the lead bank’s share is a posi-
tive signal for syndicate participants. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the loan syndica-
tion process and the syndicated loan market in Russia. Section 3 presents data and variables, and 
section 4 shows our results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2  Loan syndication in emerging markets 
 
The section is divided into two parts. First, we discuss how the loan syndication process is imple-
mented. Then, we present significant features of syndicated loans in Russia. 
 
2.1  The loan syndication process 
 
Bank loan syndication follows a three-stage sequence.
6 In the first, pre-mandated stage, competitive 
offers are solicited from one or more banks to act as arranger of the syndication (the pool of poten-
tial arrangers typically includes the borrower’s main relationship banks). The borrower next 
chooses one or more banks
7 (sole- or joint-mandated lead arranger) to form the syndicate and nego-
tiate the preliminary loan agreement. The lead arranger negotiates key loan terms, appoints partici-
pants and structures the syndicate.
8 Once designated, the lead arranger is responsible for placing the 
syndicated loan with other banks and ensuring that it is fully subscribed. The arranger’s compensa-
 
6 See Esty (2001) for a detailed presentation of syndication. 
7Such syndications are usually chosen by the borrower to maximize the likelihood of a successful syndication in terms 
of loan characteristics, subscription and duration of the syndication process. 
8 Participants lend a portion of the loan and receive a compensation essentially composed of a spread. Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski and  
Laurent Weill 
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tion is composed largely of fees for performing agency duties, costs of arrangement, securing com-
mitments, etc. 
Loan placement occurs in the second, so called post-mandated, stage. The arranger pre-
pares an information memorandum, i.e. an information package with information about borrower 
creditworthiness and loan terms. The memorandum is then distributed to a set of targeted partici-
pants largely determined by the arranger. This is backed up with a “road show” for potential par-
ticipants, at which the arranger presents the contents of the information memorandum, fields’ ques-
tions and comments, and sets forth the closing fees, timetable for commitments and closing date. 
The road show gives participants an opportunity to make suggestions about the structure and the 
pricing of the loan. Following the road show, the arranger issues formal invitations to potential par-
ticipants and sets the allocation for each participant. 
The final stage takes place after closing and the loan conditions take effect (i.e. the debt 
contract has become binding on the borrower and syndicate members). The contract sets out the 
terms and conditions of the loan (amount, purpose, period, the rate of interest plus fees, periodicity 
and repayment schedule, and collateral, if any). 
 
2.2  Loan syndication in Russia 
 
Although Russia’s first syndicated loans contracts were made in the mid-nineties, the business took 
off in 1997 as Russian banks and other enterprises failed to get access to cheaper financing options 
such as Eurobonds. Indeed, syndicated loans were the only financing method available to many 
large Russian firms as it was the only financing format requiring no credit rating. Lenders to Rus-
sian borrowers were exclusively foreign financial institutions. While the 1998 financial crisis 
crimped lending and caused a few down years in syndicated loan-taking, Russia’s buoyant eco-
nomic recovery in the early 2000s generated a rising demand for long-term financing. As Russia’s 
underdeveloped banking sector was unable to provide such financing, investment had to be financed 
either out of pocket from retained earnings or by borrowing from abroad.
9 With rising confidence in 
the Russian economy and Russian firms finally establishing credit histories, foreign banks began to 
take an interest in the Russian market. All of these factors were reflected in a significant increase in 
the amount of syndicated loans for Russian companies in 2003 to a total of $34.2 billion. Following 
 
9 Domestic bank loans were used to finance only 5% of investments in 2003 and about half of invested capital origi-
nated from retained earnings (The Banker, 2004).  
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the mini-bank crisis and the Yukos affair in 2004, lenders pulled back and there was a slight de-
crease of the amount of syndicated loans. Nevertheless, growth in lending revived again.  
From the very beginning, the main borrowers on the syndicated market have been Russian 
banks. However, in terms of volume syndicated loan market is dominated by traditionally strong 
Russian gas and oil companies. The majority of deals is arranged in US dollars. Most of the syndi-
cated loans to Russian borrowers are short-term loans i.e. up to two years. However, loan extension 
options are rather common. Banks tend to use most of their loans for refinancing and trade financ-
ing, other companies mostly for general corporate purposes.10 
 
 
3  Data and variables 
 
3.1   Data 
 
The sample of syndicated loans consists of all loan facilities in the Dealscan database, provided by 
the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters), where the borrower is from Russia. Data on loan 
characteristics come from the Dealscan database.
11 Data concerning borrower characteristics are 
taken from the Ruslana database provided by Bureau Van Dijk. Central Bank of Russia data is used 
to determine the ownership of Russian banks. 
Following Qian and Strahan (2007) and Ivashina (2009), we skip loans to financial compa-
nies owing to the specificities of these firms in comparison to others (different risk, different capital 
structure with notably a greater leverage).
12 Based on information availability of the variables used 
in the regressions, our sample consists of 528 loan facilities for the period between 1997 and 2006. 







10 For more detailed description of the Russian syndicated loans market see Zobov and Vasilyev (2009). 
11 Data on all loans in this database are given in US dollars. 
12 Altogether, about 135 of loans went to borrowers from the financial and insurance sector. Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski and  
Laurent Weill 
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3.2  Variables 
 
We focus on the potential impact of the role of the nationality of lenders on the loan spread. In this 
aim, we proceed to regressions of the spread on a set of variables including variables on the nation-
ality of lenders and some control variables. 
The explained variable in our regressions is the spread on the base rate in basis points 
(Spread). A local bank is defined as a Russian bank, i.e. domiciled in Russia. A Russian bank can 
be domestic-owned or foreign-owned. The presence of a local bank is taken into account through a 
dummy variable equal to one if at least one local bank participates in the syndicate (Local). We also 
distinguish between categories of local banks with dummy variables equal to one if a domestic-
owned (Domestic-owned) or foreign-owned (Foreign-owned) bank participates in the syndicate. A 
foreign-owned bank is a bank with a foreign ownership share exceeding 50%. 
We control for loan characteristics in the estimations. Loan size (Loan amount) is the 
amount of the loan facility. We control for the maturity of the loan (Maturity). The presence of 
covenants (Covenants) and guarantors (Guarantors) in the loan contract are taken into account by 
introducing dummy variables. We consider loan type through a dummy variable (Term loan) equal 
to one if the loan is a term loan and zero otherwise. We include dummy variables to describe the 
purpose of the loan, including debt repayment, general corporate purpose or trade finance, as well 
as to take the loan benchmark rate (Euribor and Libor) into account. 
We also consider borrower characteristics among our control variables. Following Fo-
carelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008), we include size measured by total assets (Size), debt ratio de-
fined by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Debt ratio), and return on assets measured by the 
ratio of profit before tax to total assets (ROA). We also control for the fact that the borrower is listed 
by including a dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is listed on the stock exchange (Listed). 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the variables.
13 Appendix A.1 provides their defini-
tion. We observe an average spread of 153.4 basis points, which is quite in line with the average 
spread of 161.7 basis points observed by Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008) in their analysis of 
80 countries. Only 6.12% of syndicated loans include at least one Russian bank. Russian partici-
pants are more likely to be foreign-owned banks (3.99% of loans) than domestic-owned banks 
(2.13% of loans). As expected, the typical syndicated loan is fairly large, $203 million on average.  
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While the maturity of loans is just 46 months on average, a relatively short period, we note that cor-
porate loans in Russia are usually provided for only two or three years. In this respect, the average 
maturity of syndicated loans is quite long. Moreover, it accords with the observation that most loans 
in transition countries are granted on a short-term basis. The presence of covenants and guarantors 
for loan contracts is scarce, 7.71% and 4.27%, respectively.  Finally, the vast majority of loans are 
term loans (83.55%). 
The borrowers are usually large, listed companies. Again, high mean debt ratio, 45.08%, 
implies equity represents more than half of the total balance sheet of firms in the sample. In fact, 
such debt ratios are commonly observed in transition countries (e.g. Delannay and Weill, 2004). 
They are most likely a testament to the difficulties companies face in obtaining financing. Indeed, 
Pissarides, Singer and Svejnar (2000), make this very case in their discussion of Russian firms. 
Profitability is also relatively high – an average ROA of 13.55% – reflecting the flourishing eco-
nomic conditions during the observation period.  
 
 
4  Results 
 
This section displays our results. We first present the main estimations, before displaying some ad-
ditional tests. 
 
4.1  Main estimations 
 
We perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including information on the participa-
tion of local banks in the loan and control variables. Dummy variables for years are included in the 
estimations. We consider two panels for all specifications. Panel A reports the results for all syndi-
cated loans, and includes 528 loans. Panel B reports the results for the 351 loans for which borrower 
characteristics are known. 
In Table 2, we examine whether the presence of a local bank influences the spread. The re-
sults in panels A and B show that the variable Local is not significant. This lack of significance is 
not dependent on the presence of borrower characteristics as it is observed in both estimations. 
 
13 There is no significant difference between the descriptive statistics for syndicated loans with a without the participa-
tion of a local lender. Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski and  
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Therefore, we find no support for the view that the participation of local banks in syndicated loans 
reduces information asymmetries between the borrower and lenders in Russia. 
Two control variables for loan characteristics are significant. In line with Nini (2004) and 
Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008), we observe a negative and significant coefficient for Loan 
amount. There are two possible explanations here: the existence of economies of scale in lending or 
the fact that larger borrowers are considered safer customers by syndicates. As is commonly ob-
served in other studies, Maturity is significantly negative in all estimations. As the maturity of loans 
is relatively short, this result can be explained by the fact that loans with longer duration are associ-
ated with lower default risk. 
Turning to borrower characteristics, we observe a significantly negative coefficient for 
Size. This reflects the fact that larger size is associated with lower default risk. The negative sign for 
Debt ratio can appear surprising at first glance. As greater debt ratio means greater indebtedness, 
one could expect that greater debt increases the spread by deteriorating the financial situation of the 
borrower. Nevertheless, debt can be perceived as a signal of good borrower quality and thus helps 
reduce spreads in Russia for two reasons. First, following Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977), 
debt can be seen as a signal to lenders. Indeed issuance of debt leads to a higher probability of de-
fault due to the debt-servicing costs which represent a costly outcome for firm managers and share-
holders. This signalling role of debt is particularly relevant in countries characterized by greater ex 
ante information asymmetries. As Russia is marked by a limited experience with banks (with almost 
all were established within the past two decades) and a short history of relationships between banks 
and borrowers, any track record is hard to find. Second, given the challenges Russian companies 
face in obtaining financing, higher debt level can be perceived as a good signal by lenders, by 
showing the ability of the firm to obtain loans in the past. 
We now investigate if domestic-owned banks differ from foreign-owned banks in their 
ability to exploit or overcome information asymmetries. Indeed, the absence of impact of the pres-
ence of a local bank in the first estimations may come from the fact that we have grouped both 
categories of banks, while only domestic-owned banks may have a better ability deal with informa-
tion asymmetries. In Table 3, we regress the spread on the variables taking the participation of both 
categories of local banks in the loan into account. However, our results suggest no difference be-
tween domestic-owned and foreign-owned banks. The coefficient for Domestic-owned is signifi-
cantly negative in panel A, but this result is not robust as the addition of borrower characteristics in 
panel B leads to a non-significant coefficient. The coefficient for Foreign-owned is not significant  
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in both estimations. The results for control variables are similar to those observed in the previous 
estimations. 
In a nutshell, we have two main findings. The first finding is that domestic-owned banks 
do not do any better in overcoming information asymmetries in Russia. This finding directly con-
tradicts the general finding of Nini (2004) that syndicated loans with the participation of domestic-
owned banks have lower spreads in emerging countries. Several factors unique to the Russian con-
text may explain this finding. 
First, Russian domestic-owned banks in the observation period may still have been so in-
experienced that they have yet to learn to exploit borrower information. Indeed, many of the banks 
were only established in 1990s and a considerable number of failures took place since then. More-
over, most of the syndicated loan borrowers in Russia are global companies operating in interna-
tional markets. One would be hard pressed to find local banks with comparable expertise in global 
commodity markets and the international arena. 
Second, foreign banks, regardless of whether they have a local presence, may benefit from 
better technology and know-how in risk analysis that allows them to offset the informational advan-
tage of domestic-owned banks. Indeed, this advantage has been advanced in the literature to explain 
the fact that, while domestic-owned banks are more cost-efficient than foreign-owned banks in de-
veloped countries, the finding is reversed in transition countries (see Weill, 2003; Hasan and Mar-
ton, 2003; and Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005). 
Third, Russia is highly corrupt. Transparency International ranked Russia 143
rd out of 169 
countries in its 2007 Corruption Perception Index. Weill (2008), for example, notes that corruption 
can exert a positive impact on spreads by resulting in a waste of any informational advantage offset 
by illegal practices. As a result, Russian banks are more likely to be afflicted with corruption than 
non-local banks established in more transparent Western countries. Furthermore, among local 
banks, domestic-owned banks are expected to suffer more from corruption than foreign-owned 
banks, which have more often foreign managers that have more incentives to refuse bribes. 
Our second main finding is the absence of an advantage in information for foreign-owned 
banks with a local presence over non-local banks. This suggests that there is no basis for establish-
ing a bank in Russia for the purpose of obtaining better information on borrowers and the environ-
ment. Lending could be done just as well from abroad. This conclusion is of interest in Russia 
where a relative degree of uncertainty on stability and state intervention may deter foreign banks 
from establishing a subsidiary in the country. Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski and  
Laurent Weill 
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4.2  Additional estimations 
 
Deepening the analysis, we split the sample along dimensions related to the importance of informa-
tional problems. 
Our first split is between listed and non-listed companies. Information asymmetries should 
be lower for listed companies owing to the obligations to provide information for these companies. 
The advantage in monitoring ability and in information for local banks should then play a lesser role 
when participating in a syndicated loan to a listed company. 
The result that the variable Listed was not significant in our first estimations might be ex-
plained by the fact that there are no differences in information asymmetries between listed and non-
listed companies, as they are all charged with spreads which are not significantly different. Never-
theless, one has to investigate whether the behaviour of banks differs according to their ability to 
solve information asymmetries. 
In Table 4, we analyze whether the presence of a local bank in the syndicate influences the 
spread depending whether the borrower is listed. The results in panels A and B show no significant 
coefficient for Local. Table 5 considers the participation of a domestic-owned bank or a foreign-
owned bank in the syndicate. Again, the variables for the participation of local banks are not sig-
nificant. As a consequence, our findings support the view that the fact that the borrower is listed or 
not makes no difference to lenders in dealing with information asymmetries.  
Our second split is with respect to the size of the loan, following notably Focarelli, Pozzolo 
and Casolaro (2008). The assumption is that larger loans are generally granted to larger, more 
transparent borrowers. We define a small loan as a loan of less than $150 million. The intuition is 
that local banks should have a superior monitoring ability and better information than their non-
local counterparts when it comes to small loans. In Table 6, we investigate how the presence of a 
local bank in the syndicate affects the spread for small and large loans. All estimations show no sig-
nificant coefficient for Local. We also test variables taking into account the participation of a do-
mestic-owned or foreign-owned bank in the estimations in Table 7. While the coefficient of For-
eign-owned is never significant, we obtain a significantly negative coefficient for Domestic-owned 
for the sample of small loans in Panel A. Nevertheless, this result is not robust to the inclusion of 
borrower characteristics in Panel B that leads to a non-significant coefficient. Therefore, these re-
sults corroborate our conclusion regarding the absence of any informational advantage for domes- 
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tic-owned banks or more generally for local banks. Even for small loans, we observe no significant 
impact on the spread from the presence of such banks.  
All in all, our main findings are supported by these additional estimations. We find no in-
formational advantage for local banks whether their owners are domestic or foreign.
14 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether the presence of local banks in a syndicated loan exerts an in-
fluence on the spread in Russia. Despite the contention of Nini (2004) that for local bank offers a 
possible advantage in dealing with information asymmetries in emerging economies, we find no 
evidence that the participation of local banks contributed to lower spreads for syndicated loans in 
the case of Russian borrowers. This finding is observed for domestic-owned as well as for foreign-
owned banks, as we distinguish between these categories of local banks. Additional estimations in 
which we consider subsamples for which information asymmetries are exacerbated provide similar 
results. 
Consequently, our conclusion is that local banks do not enjoy, or at least have been unable 
to exploit, an informational advantage over non-local banks (manifested as lower loan spreads for 
borrowers). Furthermore, no similar advantage could be identified for domestic-owned banks over 
foreign banks (with or without a subsidiary in Russia) or foreign-owned banks with a local presence 
have over non-local banks. The apparent inability of local banks to exploit their advantage may re-
sult from their lack of experience in acquisition of information about borrowers, the international 
sophistication of Russia’s syndicated loan-taking community, as well as the harsh impacts of cor-
ruption on local banks, particularly domestic-owned banks, relative to foreign banks based in low-
corruption countries. 
The implications of these results are numerous. For policy advisors, the persistence of an 
important domestic-owned banking industry in Russia cannot be motivated by arguments based on 
a better ability of local banks to exploit information asymmetries and provide loans with lower 
spreads. For foreign bankers, the establishment of a bank in Russia cannot be justified by the fact 
that a presence in Russia is required to be competitive in loan pricing as it provides access to better 
information. 
 
14 Furthermore, we obtain virtually same results when performing the regressions on a subsample of loans to borrowers 
operating in the oil and gas industry. Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski and  
Laurent Weill 
Asymmetric information and loan spreads in Russia: 





This analysis could be extended in a number of directions. Further work is needed to pro-
vide more evidence on the determinants of loan spreads in Russia. It might also be rewarding to as-
sess whether these findings are repeated for single-lender loans. 
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Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. Spread is given in basis points, Maturity in months. Loan Amount and Size 
are logarithms of amounts in thousands of dollars. Debt ratio and Profitability are given as percentages. 
 
   Mean  Std  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Spread 153.403  131.469  11  562.5 
Local 0.0613  0.2399  0  1 
Domestic-owned 0.0213  0.1445  0  1 
Foreign-owned 0.0399  0.1958  0  1 
Loan amount  19.14  1.14  14.79  21.82 
Maturity 46.07  16.48  2  120 
Guarantors 0.0427  0.2022  0  1 
Covenants 0.0771  0.2668  0  1 
Term loan  0.8355  0.3708  0  1 
Size 24.23  2.15  16.50  27.17 
Debt ratio  0.4508  0.2027  0.0799  0.8758 
ROA 0.1355  0.0902  -0.0617  0.4896 
Listed 0.6669  0.4715  0  1 
 
 
 Zuzana Fungáčová, Christophe J. Godlewski and  
Laurent Weill 
Asymmetric information and loan spreads in Russia: 






Participation of a local bank 
 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Table 2 reports coefficients and robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy vari-
ables for loan purpose, benchmark rate and year are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
  Regressions 
  Panel A    Panel B   
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error 
Intercept  749.441*** 100.09 977.537*** 120.84 
Local -29.631  20.37  -7.894  14.12 
Loan  amount  -20.612*** 4.43 -12.114*** 4.13 
Maturity  -0.826**  0.36 -1.020* 0.58 
Guarantors 5.107  19.09  32.114  41.27 
Covenants  -17.287 18.47 -22.970 27.75 
Term  loan  13.504 14.44 14.936 23.58 
Size -  -  -16.125***  3.31 
Debt ratio  -  -  -156.916***  36.41 
ROA -  -  31.445  56.76 
Listed -  -  -16.655  20.70 
Number  of  observations  528  345  
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Participation of a domestic-owned or foreign-owned bank 
 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Table 3 reports coefficients and robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy vari-
ables for loan purpose, benchmark rate and year are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
  Regressions 
  Panel A    Panel B   
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error 
Intercept 762.002***  99.90  984.89***  105.92 
Domestic-owned -56.619*  29.25  -7.994  24.41 
Foreign-owned 14.625  18.27  -7.753  9.69 
Loan  amount  -21.166*** 4.42 -12.117*** 4.14 
Maturity  -0.863**  0.36 -1.020* 0.59 
Guarantors 5.040  19.38  32.096  42.02 
Covenants  -18.486 18.11 -22.971 27.78 
Term  loan  12.601 14.32 14.926 23.49 
Size -  -  -16.124***  3.29 
Debt ratio  -  -  -156.943***  37.49 
Profitability -  -  31.424  57.17 
Listed -  -  -16.638  21.50 
Number  of  observations  528  345  
Adjusted  R²  0.7863  0.8556  
 
 
 Table 4 
Participation of a local bank: comparison between listed and unlisted companies 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Table 4 reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate and year are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Listed Unlisted Listed Unlisted 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Intercept  448.910***  54.35  1141.226***  155.65 -54.348 487.57  1046.383***  106.75 
Local -8.803  16.48  -4.231  23.31 -9.370  9.72 -22.827  16.01 
Loan amount  -4.467  6.02  -52.059***  7.56 -3.778* 1.96 -12.282* 6.57 
Maturity  0.333  0.86 -1.351*** 0.51 5.622*** 1.71 -1.835*** 0.39 
Guarantors 55.480  43.51  -24.349  28.41 7.388 98.11  37.658  39.75 
Covenants 42.250  33.57  -49.229**  22.58 -24.378 71.79  -9.547  41.34 
Term loan  47.600*  24.34  23.612  22.62 -191.648*** 66.43  52.980*  27.36 
Size  - - - -  26.578  23.42  -19.132***  4.86 
Debt  ratio  - - - -  108.281  126.09  -155.066***  53.74 
ROA  - - - -  -688.647***  231.16  102.327  88.28 
Number  of  observations  289  239  215  130  
Adjusted  R²  0.8467  0.7548  0.9116  0.8091  
 
 
 Table 5 
Participation of a domestic-owned or foreign-owned bank: comparison of listed and unlisted companies 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Table 5 reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate and year are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Listed Unlisted Listed Unlisted 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Intercept  450.807***  156.54 1144.312*** 156.82  -49.766  486.53 1034.708*** 105.83 
Domestic-owned  -11.183 21.87 -15.950 45.96 -11.875 13.85 -11.964 40.93 
Foreign-owned -1.733  5.13  4.181  24.65  -3.777  2.73  -25.588  18.81 
Loan amount  -4.536  6.02  -52.111***  7.59 -3.851** 1.93 -12.256* 6.61 
Maturity  0.330  0.86 -1.371*** 0.50 5.605*** 1.72 -1.817*** 0.40 
Guarantors 55.331  43.57  -23.996  28.71 5.939 99.06  39.175  42.97 
Covenants 41.932  33.72  -48.995**  22.31 -24.848 71.67  -9.935  41.24 
Term Loan  47.665*  24.35  22.969  23.19 -192.037*** 66.62  52.973*  27.51 
Size  - - - -  26.556  23.43  -19.092***  4.83 
Debt  ratio  - - - -  106.077  126.89  -153.397***  53.89 
ROA  - - - -  -689.463***  231.49  102.956  88.93 
Number  of  observations  289  239  215  130  
Adjusted  R²  0.8467  0.7548  0.9117  0.8092  
 
 Table 6 
Participation of a local bank: comparison of large and small loans 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Each panel reports respectively the results for small loans (less than $150 million) and for 
large loans (over $150 million). Table 6 reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate and year are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Large loans  Small loans  Large loans  Small loans 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std  error Coefficient Std  error Coefficient Std  error Coefficient Std  error 
Intercept  484.040***  55.07  1244.129***  247.44 333.189 306.69  1101.458***  291.07 
Local  -12.918 21.17 -32.991 23.37 12.453 13.86 -10.026 21.06 
Loan amount  -2.207  2.27  -47.883***  13.29 0.200  0.91 -19.501  18.97 
Maturity  -0.553  0.65 -1.364*** 0.40 -4.883*** 1.81  -1.522**  0.65 
Guarantors 71.913**  32.28  -30.343 20.61  96.928 138.21 12.093  66.10 
Covenants  -54.923  37.67 0.792 23.72  98.955*  49.82  -15.842  35.01 
Term loan  35.129*  18.22  -5.798  20.46 55.621 58.71 32.043 38.82 
Size  - - - -  -3.729  11.44  -10.621***  3.95 
Debt  ratio  - - - -  -166.392  162.47  -171.514***  56.17 
ROA  - - - -  311.924**  124.76  -70.802  93.81 
Listed  - - - -  -40.117  30.10  -15.645  28.05 
Number of observations  278    250  222  123  
Adjusted R²  0.8883    0.6741  0.9691  0.7507  
 
 
 Table 7 
Participation of a domestic-owned or a foreign-owned bank: comparison of large and small loans 
 
Definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. The dependent variable is Spread. Each Panel reports respectively the results for small loans (less than $150 million) and for 
large loans (over $150 million). Table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
Dummy variables for loan purpose, benchmark rate and year are included in the regressions, but not reported. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  Large loans  Small loans  Large loans  Small loans 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std.  error Coefficient Std. error  Coefficient  Std. error 
Intercept  484.041***  55.07  1269.551***  247.35 333.189 306.69  1080.341***  296.58 
Domestic-owned  - -  -50.386*  29.45  - -  -3.475  27.14 
Foreign-owned -12.918  21.17  16.272  26.52 12.453 13.86 -33.599 25.05 
Loan amount  -2.208  2.27  -49.027***  13.48 0.200  0.91 -18.046  19.59 
Maturity  -0.553  0.65 -1.396*** 0.39 -4.883*** 1.81  -1.530**  0.65 
Guarantors 71.913**  32.28  -29.702 21.00  96.928 138.21 12.211  66.24 
Covenants -54.923  37.67  -2.463  23.84 98.955** 49.82  -15.082  35.50 
Term loan  35.129*  18.22  -6.619  20.34 55.621 58.71 33.592 38.53 
Size  - - - -  -3.729  11.44  -10.813***  4.05 
Debt  ratio  - - - -  -166.392  162.47  -167.867***  56.68 
ROA  - - - -  311.924**  124.76  -68.693  93.04 
Listed  - - - -  -40.117  30.10  -17.198  28.81 
Number  of  observations  278  250  222  123  
Adjusted  R²  0.8883  0.6774  0.9691  0.7512  
 
 
 Appendix A.1. Brief descriptions of variables and their sources 
 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Loan contract characteristics   
Syndicated  = 1 if the loan is syndicated  Dealscan 
Loan amount  Logarithm of loan size in dollars  Dealscan 
Maturity  Maturity of loan in months  Dealscan 
Guarantors  = 1 if there is at least one guarantor  Dealscan 
Covenants  = 1 if the loan agreement includes covenants  Dealscan 
Term loan  = 1 if the facility is a term loan  Dealscan 
   
Borrower characteristics   
Size  Logarithm of the company size in dollars  Ruslana 
Debt ratio  Total liabilities to total assets  Ruslana 
ROA  Ratio of profit before taxes to total assets  Ruslana 
Listed  = 1 if the borrower is listed on the stock exchange  Dealscan 
    
Lender nationality   
Local  = 1 if a Russian bank participates in the loan  CBR 
Domestic-owned  = 1 if a Russian domestic-owned bank 
participates in the loan 
CBR 
Foreign-owned  = 1 if a foreign-owned bank operating in Russia 
participates in the loan 
CBR 
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